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Bailout policy in a globalized economy
Nelly Exbrayaty, Thierry Madièszand Stéphane Rioux
Abstract
This paper explores how trade integration inuences the decision by national
governments to bailout manufacturing rms. We develop a 2-country model of
generalized oligopoly with heterogenous rms and trade costs. High-cost rms are
eligible for a bailout while low-cost rms are protable. Our results show that trade
liberalization inuences both political benets of a bailout and its relative cost as
compared to a laissez-faire policy. If the fall in trade cost is so large that it allows
high-cost rms to become exporters, governments might move away from a bailout
policy to a laissez-faire policy. In contrast, a marginal decline in trade costs that
does not a¤ect the export status of high-cost rms, always makes governments more
prone to adopt a bailout decision.
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rms; trade
cost; location.
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1 Introduction
A rm or any institution is faced with a soft-budget constraint if it expects to be bailed
out in case of nancial trouble. This creates a moral hazard problem as the expectation of
a bailout can erode managerse¤ort and thereby encourage failure.1 Originally developed
by Kornai (1979, 1986), the concept of soft-budget constraint(hereafter SBC) was rst
designed to describe the behavior of governments in centrally planned and transition
economies.2 However, the recent crisis period resulted in a widespread policy of industry
bailout in most of the developed countries, in addition to tremendous rescue plans in
the nancial and banking sector. The most emblematic example is certainly the federal
bailout for Americas Big Three automobile companies in 2009, but many rescue plans
have been decided in other countries and industrial sectors over the past decades.3 These
examples corroborate the claim by Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003, p. 56) that the
e¤ects of the SBC syndrome are clearly perceptible in the traditionally capitalist part of
the world as well. One reason is that some determinants like the political desirability of
a bailout are not proper to a particular economic or political system (see. Robinson and
Torvik, 2009). Politicians may be politically motivated to grant subsidies to companies
in nancial trouble to save jobs. In addition, policy-makers may be concerned by the too
big to failargument when failures cause negative spillovers on the rest of the economy.
The soft budget constraint phenomenon has been studied mainly in a closed economy
framework (see. Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003 ). This is clearly a limit of the literature
because corporate bailouts in well-established market economies have been taking place
over the two last decades in a new context of globalization characterized by both increasing
capital mobility and trade openness. Our paper aims at analyzing how corporate bail-out
decisions can be shaped by these two driving forces of globalization.
A vast empirical literature shows that globalization disciplines governments. It could
incite them to reduce waste and ine¢ cient policies in order to provide a more business-
1For example, rms might under-invest in order to become unprotable and obtain subsidies (Segal,
1998).
2Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003) provide a detailed review of the soft-budget constraint literature.
3Even in the European Union where state aids are forbidden as soon as they threaten to distort
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods (article 107 of the
TFEU), governments can bailout rms through the so-called State aids for rescuing and restructuring
rms in di¢ culty. According to Chindooroy, Muller and Notaro (2007), 86 rescue and restructuring State
aid cases were approved by the Commission between 1995 and 2003, in various sectors and mostly in
western countries. For additionnal examples of bailouts in developed countries over the period 1980-2008,
see Kornai (2009).
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friendly environment (see. Rodrik, 1997, Schulze and Ursprung, 1999).4 One could there-
fore expect that globalization moderates the use of corporate bailouts. Yet, few theoretical
contributions explore this issue. An exception is the contribution by Alexeev and Jang
(2010), that places Segals (1998) SBC model within Melitz (2003) framework character-
ized by trade and heterogeneous rms. The main SBC-induced ine¢ ciency arises from
the fact that some rms subject to a bailout exert a sub-optimal e¤ort. Trade liberaliza-
tion reduces this ine¢ ciency and the number of rms eligible for a bailout by raising the
average level of e¤ort. However, this contribution does not specically address whether
or not trade costs also inuence bailout decisions. In addition, they abstract from the
e¤ects of rm mobility. Another important contribution by Qian and Roland (1998) ex-
plores the determinants of the SBC in the context of federal economies. They show that
by inducing scal competition among local governments, factor mobility increases the
opportunity costs of bailout and then serves as a commitment device(Qian and Roland,
1998, p. 1143). In sum, while the latter contribution provides a rst insight regarding
the impact of capital mobility on corporate bailouts, the former explores how trade liber-
alization inuences the number of rms eligible for such bailouts. Our contribution goes
further by investigating the issue of corporate bailouts in economies characterized by both
capital mobility and international trade.
To do so, we develop a trade and location model with two symmetric countries and
heterogeneous rms. Some rms are domestic and immobile, while others are mobile
and owned by foreign investors residing in a third country. They all compete on the same
oligopolistic market. Importantly, foreign rms are always protable because they are run
by market-oriented managers. In contrast, domestic ones are run by politically-connected
managers and might be eligible for a bailout. Our model thus captures two important
features. Firstly, the existence of politically-connected rms and their higher probability
to be rescued by the government is documented by Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006)
for a large sample of (mostly) developed countries.5 Secondly, capital invested in these
rms is often partially state-owned and might therefore be less footloose than capital
invested in competing multinational rms. Finally, our model exhibits various interactions
embedded in a sequential game à la Qian and Roland (1998). In a rst stage, politically-
connected managers choose to exert either a high or low e¤ort. A high e¤ort can be viewed
as restructuring the rm. In contrast, a low e¤ort results in nancial di¢ culties for the
4See. Cai and Tresman (2005) for an opposite view.
5Firms are dened as politically-connected when at least one of its large shareholders or one of its top
o¢ cers is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party.
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rm so that it cannot survive without a bailout. In the latter case, the government has
to decide in a second stage whether to rescue the rm through a full exoneration of the
corporate tax (bailout policy) or to let it go bankrupt (laissez-faire policy). Importantly,
we retain a too-big to failargument by assuming that political benets from a bailout
accruing to the government are proportional to the size of rms, or equivalently, to their
total labor force. In a third stage, governments non-cooperatively levy a lump-sum tax on
all protable rms. The two last stages describe the location choice of foreign investors
and the market outcome.
Our model suggests a non-univocal relationship between trade liberalization and the
decisions to bailout, because trade costs can inuence the relative cost of a bailout and
its political benets in various ways.
Firstly, the trade cost level inuences political benets through its impact on the
export status of rm, and, in ne, on their size. When trade costs are high, a rm eligible
for a bailout is not competitive enough to export and bilateral trade is exclusively driven
by foreign rms set up in each country (trade regime 1 ). This is only once trade costs
reach a lower threshold value that the former begins to export as well (trade regime 2 ).
Depending on whether trade regime 1 or 2 prevails, the impact of trade liberalization
on the size of rms eligible for a bailout goes in opposite directions: it increases with a
fall in trade costs when they are exporter whereas it shrinks when they only serve the
domestic market because of ercer competition. As a result, trade liberalization reduces
(resp. increases) political benets from a bailout under trade regime 1 (resp. trade regime
2).
Secondly, a bailout also distorts the market outcome by sustaining domestic competi-
tors. As argued by Slaughter (2008), the evaluation of the cost of a bailout policy must
account for the way foreign and footloose competitors set up in the country may react to
such a distortion. In our model, a bailout policy maintains a higher number of domestic
competitors on the market, so that mobile rms are more responsive to a rise in taxation.
This often leads governments to set lower taxes and extract less tax revenues if they rescue
rms than if they adopt a laissez-faire policy. Importantly, this relative cost of a bailout
as compared to a laissez-faire policy is bigger when rms eligible for a bailout become
exporters, but it diminishes with the gradual decline in trade costs whatever the trade
regime.
By combining these e¤ects, we obtain our main nding that can be summarized as
follows. When trade regime 1 prevails, the gradual decline in trade costs makes the bailout
policy more and more likely. Indeed, the decrease in the relative cost of a bailout does
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more than compensate the fall in its political benets. When the two countries switch
from trade regime 1 to trade regime 2, the laissez-faire policy becomes more likely because
of the sudden rise in the relative cost of the bailout. Lastly, as trade integration deepens
further, incentives to bail out domestic rms unambiguously grow because the relative
cost of a bailout shrinks while its political benets increase.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section
2. In the following sections, we solve the sequential game by backward induction. Section
3 is devoted to the presentation of production and consumption outcomes for a given
spatial distribution of mobile rms and for given policy decisions. This allows us to
identify the range of trade cost values corresponding to each trade regime and to analyze
how competition e¤ects are inuenced by the decision to rescue rms or not. In section 4,
we describe the location equilibrium and the tax competition outcome in our benchmark
case (trade regime 2 ), for a given policy decision regarding rms eligible for a bailout. In
section 5, we analyze the determinants of the bailout decision by governments across each
trade regime and the last section concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of two countries, labelled i = A;B, equally populated by LA =
LB = L=2 individuals.6 There are two factors of production labor and capital and
two sectors, which are always active in the two countries. Each individual in country i
provides one unit of labor and is endowed with an equal share of capital. These factors are
employed in the country of residence of the individual. The stock of domestic capital is
completed by foreign capital owned by individuals living outside the economy. Contrary
to domestic capital, foreign capital is mobile and can be invested either in country A or B.
While labor can either be employed in a manufacturing sector (M sector) or a traditional
sector (T sector), capital is only needed in the former.
The M sector is characterized by k oligopolistic rms producing a homogenous good
x. Exporting this good involves a per-unit cost of  units of numeraire. These rms
enjoy increasing returns to scale. A xed quantity of capital that we normalize to unity
and one local manager are always required to start production. Moreover, they may
di¤er in two respects. Firstly, rms relying on domestic capital are immobile whereas
those using foreign capital are mobile.7 Secondly, depending on the origin of the capital
6Countries are assumed to be identical in all respects in order to control for any comparative advantage.
7The wave of privatization that began in developped countries in the late 1970s is not completely
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of the rm they run, the managersprole is not the same. Managers of foreign rms
are market-oriented: they always exert a high e¤ort resulting in a low marginal cost so
that their rm is protable. In contrast, domestic rms are run by managers that are
connected politicallywith the government. These managers know that their rm can
potentially be bailed-out in case of nancial trouble. Therefore, they can choose among
two levels of e¤ort: a low e¤ort results in a high marginal cost of production so that the
rm becomes eligible for a bailout and survive if and only if this bailout is implemented,
whereas a high e¤ort leads to the same marginal cost as foreign rms and guarantees their
protability without any governmental support. To summarize, domestic and immobile
rms run by politically-connected managers compete with foreign and mobile rms run
by market-oriented managers on the same oligopolistic market.
In the T sector, rms produce the numeraire commodity z under perfect competition
using workers only. Specically, one unit of labour is required to produce one unit of
output, so that wages are equalized to one in this sector.
Note that our modelling of the labor market shares many common assumptions with
footloose capital models (see, Henderson and Thisse, 2004) : labor supply is inelastic,
immobile across countries but mobile across sectors and the numéraire sector is always
active in both countries. We make two additional assumptions. For convenience and to
avoid the modelling of two distinct labor markets, managers and production workers are
perfect substitutes. It allows all wages to be equalized to unity as in footloose capital
models. Thus, our approach voluntarily abstracts from wage considerations in order
to focus on the role of employment for the bailout decision. Secondly, we ensure that
whatever the bailout decision and the resulting market outcome, the total labor supply is
high enough to make production possible. These two assumptions are explicitly described
in the Appendix A.
In the following, we describe in more detail the di¤erent types of manufacturing rms
(section 2.1) and the sequence of interactions between rms and governments (section
2.2).
achieved (see Bortoletti and Faccio, 2009). As a result, in many countries, capital invested in former
state-owned rms is still mostly owned by the government and less footloose than capital invested in
competing multinational rms. With our modelling strategy regarding the manufacturing sector, we try
to build a model that ts this context.
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2.1 Manufacturing rms and the government
We set the total number of domestic rms to 4 (2 in each country).8 Their managers are
strongly linked to the government. Therefore, their behavior depends on their expecta-
tions of nancial support they might receive from policy-makers. Specically, politically-
connected managers can choose among two alternatives. The rst one consists in making
a high e¤ort which can be interpreted as strongly restructuring. In this case, the rm
enjoys a zero marginal cost, is protable and thus subject to lump-sum taxation by the
government. Alternatively, the manager can exert a low e¤ort. In this case, the marginal
cost is positive and normalized to one labor unit. These high cost rms are considered as
eligible for a bailout. We model this bailout in a simple way by assuming that it takes the
form of a full tax exemption, a common mean to rescue rms (see Kornai, Maskin and
Roland, 2003, and Shleifer and Treisman, 2000).9 Without such a tax exemption, high
cost rms go bankrupt.
Because of their position, politically-connected managers also enjoy non-monetary
benets. By non-monetary benets, we consider all advantages resulting from their rela-
tionship with some members of the government, which gives them some political inuence.
These benets are assumed to be higher, the larger the number of workers employed in
the rm. Specically, each politically-connected managers receives (net of e¤ort) benets
equal to E times the number of workers employed. Let ` denote the total labor force (in-
cluding the manager) in a high-cost rm. Thus, a politically-connected manager receives
E  ` if he exerts a low e¤ort, and E if he exerts a high e¤ort since in this case ` = 1.
This is in line with Qian and Roland (1998) who assume that benets are higher when
managers exert a low e¤ort and anticipate a bailout, in order to ensure that a bailout
decision can arise at the equilibrium. Moreover, this modeling strategy is a simple way
to render the bailout decision endogenous to the number of jobs in the manufacturing
sector (see, section 5). Specically, our model captures the too big to failargument that
contributes to explain why governments often choose to rescue the largest rms.
The remaining k   4 foreign rms are run by market-oriented managers. They feel
entirely responsible for the survival of the rm and thus always exert a high e¤ort inducing
8We x the number of politically-connected rms in each country to 2 in order to convey our message
in a simple way and to simplify the algebra. However, we could develop our analysis for any given number
of domestic rms without changing our qualitative results.
9Tax exemptions fall in one of the categories of means of rescue listed by Kornai, Maskin and roland
(2003). This category consists of scal means, that can either take the form of subsidies or tax concessions.
The two other categories are credit and the various indirect methods of support.
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a zero marginal cost. As these rms are protable, they are subject to lump-sum taxation
by the government of the hosting country. Recalling that capital invested in these rms
is mobile, their capital owners will thus compare the net prots across the two countries
and decide to invest where the net-return to capital is the highest.
2.2 Sequence of events
Our model contains various forms of interactions that are embedded in the following
sequential game (see Figure 1):
Stage 0 [E¤ort choice of politically connected managers]. Politically connected man-
agers choose a high or low level of e¤ort given the value of individual non-monetary
benets, and anticipating the outcome of all subsequent stages.
Stage 1 [Bailout or laissez-faire policy]. If a low e¤ort is chosen at stage 0, gov-
ernments decide whether to rescue high-cost rms through a full tax exemption (bailout
policy), or to let them go bankrupt (laissez-faire policy). When doing so, they perfectly
anticipate the tax competition outcome, the location of foreign rms and the resulting
market outcome.
Stage 2 [Taxation of rms]. Governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively
choose the level of lump-sum tax levied on all low-cost rms, given decisions taken at
stages 0 and 1. At this stage, governments perfectly anticipate the location of foreign
rms as well as the market outcome.
Stage 3 [Location of foreign rms]. Foreign capital owners decide whether to invest
in country A or B given the observed levels of taxation in each country and anticipating
the market outcome.
Stage 4 [Production and consumption]. Surviving rms make their output choices
and consumption takes place. The remaining rms go bankrupt.
As we can see from Figure 1, the sequential game consists of 4 or 5 stages depending
on the e¤ort choice made by politically-connected managers. Importantly, decisions taken
at stages 0 and 1 will lead to three potential decision paths denoted by  2 H; H;S	,
where H and H refer to a laissez-faire policy (or hard-budget constraint) and S stands for
the bailout scenario (or soft-budget constraint). Among these three potential outcomes,
only decision paths H and S in solid lines are perfect subgame equilibrium candidates.
Let us rst assume that managers perfectly anticipate a bailout. Then, as E  ` > E,
they will prefer to exert a low level of e¤ort because they will enjoy higher non-monetary
benets than if they exert a high e¤ort. Let us now consider that they anticipate a laissez-
8
Figure 1: Structure of the game
faire policy. Then, it is always optimal for politically-connected managers to exert a high
level of e¤ort as it yields a positive non-monetary benet E. Otherwise, the rm goes
bankrupt, managers lose their job and thus receive no benet. The decision path H in
dotted lines is therefore o¤ the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, we need to evaluate the
outcome along this decision path in order to determine which one of the decision paths S
or H will be the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game (see section 5).
As this is well known, the solution to such a sequential game is given by a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium that we obtain by backward induction beginning with the last
stage of the game.10 In the following section, we analyze how production and consumption
choices made in the last stage are inuenced by the bailout vs. laissez-faire decision.
3 Short-run equilibrium (stage 4)
In this section, we present the outcome at the last stage of the game. We call it the short-
run equilibrium as it describes the production and consumption outcomes for a given
spatial distribution of foreign rms.
10Because of the symmetry of our model, this equilibrium outcome is the same in each country.
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3.1 Consumption
Individuals share identical preferences given by a quasi-linear utility function:
ui = ax

i  
1
2
 
xi
2
+ zi 8 i 2 fA;Bg and  2

H; H;S
	
(1)
where xi is the consumption of the manufacturing good, zi the consumption of the nu-
meraire and z is the individual endowment in the numeraire.
Let Ti stand for tax revenues from all low-cost rms that are redistributed equally
and in a lump-sum fashion to the consumers in each country. The budget constraint for
a representative consumer in each country i is then:
1 + z +
T i
L=2
+
2l;i
L=2
= zi + p

ix

i if  2 fHg
1 + z +
T i
L=2
= zi + p

ix

i if  2

H;S
	
where pi is the price of the good produced in the M-sector and 
l;
i is the after-tax return
to capital invested in domestic rms that are low-cost. Importantly, individuals receive
no income from capital when managers of domestic rms exert a low e¤ort. Indeed, in
such a case, two scenarios can occur. If governments adopt a laissez-faire policy ( = H),
the decision to produce would induce a negative net return to capital. Thus, rms go
bankrupt and individuals earn no capital income. If governments instead decide to rescue
these rms through a tax exemption ( = S), we assume that the bailout just allows rms
to survive.11 In our model, it means that the gross return to capital invested in high-cost
rms is equal to zero.
Utility maximization leads to the individual inverse demand function with respect to
the manufacturing good
pi = a  xi (2)
Aggregating the demand over all consumers yields market demand curves for each country
i in the oligopolistic industry :
Xi =
L
2
 
a  pi

11For the sake of simplicity, we do not explicitly model their protability condition but the bailout can
be viewed as necessary for the repayment of loans.
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3.2 Production
We assume manufacturing rms compete in quantities.12 Before describing their output
choices, two comments are in order.
Firstly, we point out that both the e¤ort choice of managers and the bailing-out
decision of governments a¤ect the number of competitors on the market, and thus the
toughness of competition, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Number and type of rms
The rst path occurs when politically-connected managers decide to exert a high
e¤ort given their anticipation of a laissez-faire policy ( = H). As a result, there will be
oligopolistic competition among k low-cost rms, among which 4 domestic rms and k 4
foreign rms. Along the second path, politically-connected managers exert a low e¤ort
while the government adopts a laissez-faire policy ( = H). This implies oligopolistic
competition among k   4 foreign low-cost rms. The last path describes the bailout
policy ( = S), and gives rise to oligopolistic competition among k heterogenous rms: 4
domestic high-cost rms, and k   4 foreign low-cost rms.
Secondly, the level of trade liberalization shapes output decisions. Indeed, recall that
the cost incurred by a rm for exporting each unit of the manufacturing good is equal
to  units of the numeraire.13 Because of these trade costs, rms are able to segment
their markets by choosing the quantities to sell on the domestic and the foreign market
independently.
We are now equipped to describe the product market outcome. Let xc;ii and x
c;
ij
denote the output choices made by a rm located in country i, which depend on the
marginal cost, low or high (c 2 fl; hg) as well as the number of surviving rms through
 2 H; H;S	. Before-tax prots made by low-cost and high-cost surviving rms are
12The same modeling strategy is used, among others, by Gaigné and Wooton (2011), Hauer and
Wooton (2010), and Thisse (2010).
13This captures all frictions making bilateral trade costly including transport costs or administrative
barriers to the free mobility of goods between countries.
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described by equations 3 and 4 respectively:
l;i = p

ix
l;
ii +
 
pj   

xl;ij   1  rl;i with  2

H; H;S
	
(3)
h;Si =
 
pSi   1

xh;Sii +
 
pSj   1  

xh;Sij   1  rh;Si (4)
where rl;i is the gross return to capital. In the long run, this return to capital absorbs all
operating prots.
Maximizing (3) and (4) with respect to quantities, we get the following output levels
for a low-cost rm:
xl;ii =
L
2
pi and x
l;
ij =
L
2
 
pj   

with  2 H; H;S	 (5)
and for a surviving high-cost rm:
xh;Sii =
L
2
 
pSi   1

and xh;Sij =
L
2
 
pSj   1  

(6)
Equilibrium prices are obtained by inserting the equilibrium output choices (5) and
(6) in the market clearing conditions. Let i denotes the share of foreign rms located in
country i under , then equilibrium prices are as follows:
p
H
i 
a+ 
h

H
j (k   4)
i
k   3 (7)
pHi 
a+ 

Hj (k   4) + 2

k + 1
(8)
pSi 
a+ 

Sj (k   4) + 2

+ 4
k + 1
(9)
Three comments are in order. Firstly, observe that the toughness of competition is
captured by the denominator of each expression (equal to the number of surviving rms
plus one). Secondly, pSi > p
H
i at the symmetric location equilibrium where j = 1=2.
Indeed, the average marginal costs is higher under bailout policy because high-cost rms
survive. Moreover p Hi > p
H
i at j = 1=2, because the number of competitors is lower
when governments let high-cost rms go brankrupt. Finally, as the number of surviving
rms resulting from H di¤ers from the one arising from S and H, the price responsiveness
to the spatial distribution of foreign rms varies accordingly. Specically, we verify that
dp
H
i =dj > dp
H
i =dj = dp
S
i =dj.
We now determine the trade feasibility conditions ensuring that exporting is always
protable for rms along the two equilibrium paths  2 fH;Sg. We obtain the following
condition for low-cost rms located in i:
xl;Hij > 0 8  < H = 2
a
k + 2
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and the same condition applies for rms located in country j.14 The trade feasibility
condition ensuring that high-cost rms export is given by:
xh;Sij > 0 8  < S = 2
a  k + 3
k + 2
with S > 0 for all a > amin  k   3.15
Clearly, these two threshold values can be ranked in the following manner:16
S < H
Thus, the level of trade costs a¤ects the distribution of surviving rms on the export
market as stated by Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Let us dene trade regime 1 by  2  S; H and trade regime 2 by  2  0; S.
Then:
 Under trade regime 1, low-cost rms are exporters while high-cost rms only serve
their domestic market;
 Under trade regime 2, all rms serve both markets.
Starting from the highest possible level of prohibitive trade cost (that is, H), trade
liberalization will rst allow low-cost rms to export and it is only once trade costs reach
a lower threshold value (that is, S) that high-cost rms rescued by the government will
also begin to export.17Therefore, we explore the e¤ects of liberalization over a wider range
of trade cost values than in Okubo, Picard and Thisse (2010), who focus on the spatial
selection of rms induced by trade liberalization under trade regime 218.
14The model being symmetric, all trade feasibility conditions are evaluated at i = 

j = 1=2 and apply
also to rms located in country j.
15Hereafter, this condition is considered as fullled. The demand parameter a is high enough to make
the export by bailed-out rms dependent on the trade cost level.
16The condition ensuring that low-cost rms are protable on the export market writes  <
2a= (k   2)   H . This is the less restrictive condition as we verify that  H is always higher than
S and H .
17Note also that pSi < p
~H
i when  < 
S .
18In their paper, all rms are mobile and export whatever their cost level and the market size di¤ers
across countries.
13
4 Tax Policy and Location under Trade Regime 2:
Laissez-faire vs. Bailout
In the following subsections, we consider trade regime 2 as a benchmark case to solve
both the location and the tax competition equilibria. This will allow us to compare the
impact of a laissez-faire versus bailout policy on the location of foreign rms (section 4.1)
and on the tax competition outcome (section 4.2). Trade regime 1 will be analyzed in
section 5, where we solve the stages 1 and 0, and study the e¤ect of trade liberalization
on the bailout decision for both trade regimes.
4.1 Location equilibrium (stage 3)
In the long run, the equilibrium rental rate to foreign capital in each country is determined
by a bidding process, which ends when no foreign rm can earn a strictly positive prot
at the equilibrium market price. Therefore, before taxation, the equilibrium rental rate
to capital writes:
rl;i = p

ix
l;
ii +
 
pj   

xl;ij   1 with  2

H; H;S
	
rh;Si =
 
pSi   1

xh;Sii +
 
pSj   1  

xh;Sij   1
As governments non-cooperatively impose a lump-sum tax ti on low-cost rms set up
within their respective jurisdictions, the after-tax return to capital invested in low-cost
rms in country i is given by:
l;i = r
l;
i   ti (10)
Owners of capital invested in foreign rms decide to invest in the most protable
country. Therefore, the location of foreign rms is governed by the spatial di¤erence in
net returns to capital l; =

rl;A   tA

 

rl;B   tB

. After inserting equilibrium prices
and quantities in (10), we obtain:
l; =
8>><>>:
tB   tA   L 2
 
2A   1

(k   4)
k + 1
for  2 fH;Sg
tB   tA   L 2
 
2A   1

(k   4)
k   3 for  =
H
The location equilibrium for each  can be dened as the share of foreign rms located
in country A (A) such that 
 = 0, that is:
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
H
A =
1
2
  1
2
k   3
L 2 (k   4) (tA   tB)
HA = 
S
A =
1
2
  1
2
k + 1
L 2 (k   4) (tA   tB)
(11)
The above location equilibria are the result of two forces.
The rst one is standard and depicts a pro-competitive e¤ect. When a country hosts
new rms, incumbent rms face more competitors in their domestic market and fewer
in the other one. Thus, the domestic price falls while it rises in the other market (see
equations 7, 8 and 9). Because domestic sales generate more revenues in the presence of
trade costs, this e¤ect acts as a dispersion force. Importantly, this e¤ect is proportional
to the number of surviving rms and is captured by the terms k   3 and k + 1. This
number being the same under  2 (H;S), the location equilibrium is identical.
The second force results from the impact of the tax wedge on the location choice.19 A
unilateral rise in corporate taxation in country i leads to an outow of capital (di =dt

i <
0). Moreover, as competition is ercer when  2 fH;Sg, rms are more responsive to
tax variations and the tax base erosion e¤ect is stronger. We also verify that the tax
base elasticity (dened as "i =  @i =@ti  ti =i ) increases when trade costs fall because
prices become less and less responsive to the spatial distribution of rms. In other terms,
gradual trade integration weakens the pro-competitive e¤ect which increases the weight
of taxes in the capital location choice.
4.2 Tax competition (stage 2)
Governments decide non-cooperatively and independently upon their tax policy. We
assume that their objective is to maximize:
W i = R

i + 'E

i
where Ri denotes the overall net income of residents. E

i stands for total non-monetary
benets received by politically-connected managers and ' > 0 is a parameter aimed at
capturing how much the government cares about them. Interestingly, as Ei incorporates
the labor force employed by domestic rms in the manufacturing sector, ' can also be
viewed as the extent to which governments care about those jobs.
19Despite their lump-sum form, taxes distort the investment choice through the spatial distribution of
foreign rms.
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Each one of the component of this objective function varies across the decision paths
. The overall income of residents is given by:
RHi =
L
2
(1 + z) + tHi

(k   4) Hi + 2

+ 2l;Hi
Ri =
L
2
(1 + z) + ti

(k   4) i

for  2 f H;Sg:
The rst term stands for the labor income and the initial endowment in numeraire. The
second terms denote tax revenues redistributed in a lump-sum fashion to residents, and
the third term in RHi stands for the net return to capital invested in low-cost domestic
rms (see eq. 3).
In order to describe total external benets accruing to politically-connected managers,
recall that xh;Sii + x
h;S
ij gives the number of production workers employed by domestic
high-cost rms. Total employment in each rm  including the manager  is equal to
` = 1 + xh;Sii + x
h;S
ij when  = S whereas it is equal to 1 in domestic low-cost rms when
 = H.20 Therefore, we obtain:
ESi = 2E

1 + xh;Sii + x
h;S
ij

EHi = 2E
In the following, we present the tax outcome under laissez-faire (section 4.2.1) and bailout
(section 4.2.2) policies.
4.2.1 Tax equilibrium under laissez-faire policy
We present the tax outcome when politically-connected managers exert a high e¤ort and
a low e¤ort.
Politically-connected managers exert a high e¤ort
Let us rst assume that politically-connected managers exert a high e¤ort in stage 0.
All rms being e¢ cient and protable, no public intervention is needed in stage 1 which
is equivalent to a laissez-faire policy ( = H). Hence, the rst-order condition for each
government at stage 2 writes:
dWHi
dtHi
= Hi (k   4)
 "Hi   1| {z }
+= 
+ 2 + 2
@l;Hi
@tHi| {z }
 
= 0 (12)
20Recall that there are no external benets when  2 ~H since domestic high-cost rms go bankrupt.
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The rst term captures the taxation e¤ect passing through tax revenues collected
from foreign rms. For a given tax base, a marginal increase in tHi raises tax revenues
redistributed to residents. Nevertheless, this e¤ect can be counterbalanced by a tax base
e¤ect capturing the capital outow that results from a marginal increase in tHi . The total
e¤ect will be negative (resp. positive) if the tax base elasticity is higher (resp. lower) than
1 in absolute value.21 The second term gives the tax revenues collected from domestic
rms. The last term captures the e¤ect on the net return to capital invested in domestic
rms. Evaluated at the location equilibrium, this net return to capital amounts to:
l;Hi = r
l;H   1
2
(ti + tj) +
1
4
(ti   tj)2
L 2
(13)
with
rl;H =
1
4
L
4a (a  ) +  2 (k (k + 2) + 2)
(k + 1)2
:
Observe that both a higher average tax rate and a lower tax wedge between countries re-
duce the after-tax return on capital, as in Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005). Derivating
(13) with respect to tHi , we verify that a unilateral rise in business taxation in country i
always reduces the net return to capital (@l;Hi =@t
H
i < 0).
Solving the rst order condition for each government and crossing the reaction func-
tions, we obtain:
tHi  tH = L 2
k   2
k + 1
8 i 2 fA;Bg (14)
Politically-connected managers exert a low e¤ort
Let us now consider that politically-connected managers exert a low e¤ort in stage 0
and governments choose the laissez-faire policy in stage 1. Given that all domestic rms
exit the market, there is no income from domestic capital and governments objective
function sums up to maximization of tax revenues from foreign rms. Therefore, at stage
2, the governments rst-order condition is:
dW
H
i
dt
H
i
= 
H
i (k   4)
" Hi   1| {z }
+= 
= 0
Interestingly, the impact of a marginal rise in business taxation on tax revenues has a
di¤erent magnitude than when  = H. Indeed, the capital outow induced by a marginal
rise in taxation (and thus, the tax base elasticity) is now lower because competition is
relaxed by the liquidation of high-cost rms.
21We easily check that
"Hi  > 1 at the equilibrium.
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After solving the rst-order conditions, we obtain the following tax equilibrium:
t
H
i  t H = L 2
k   4
k   3 8 i 2 fA;Bg (15)
4.2.2 Tax equilibrium under bailing-out decision
We now turn to the tax outcome that occurs if governments decide to bailout rms in
nancial trouble at the previous stage of the game ( = S). The rst-order condition of
each government at stage 2 is given by:
dW Si
dtSi
= Si (k   4)
 "Si   1| {z }
+= 
+ 2'E
d`
dtSi| {z }
0
= 0
The rst term of the rst-order condition is qualitatively and quantitatively similar
to the one arising when  = H, because location equilibria are identical. The second
term describes a new relationship between tax policy and the total non-monetary benets
arising from the governments bailout. Interestingly, this incentive exists if and only if
trade costs are higher than the threshold S (trade regime 1). In this case, the total
requirement in production labor of a rescued rm is equal to domestic sales only (xh;Sii ). By
raising the business tax, the government induces a capital outow that relaxes competition
on the domestic market and increases the output per bailed-out rm. However, this
relationship disappears when  < S, which corresponds to trade regime 2 under scrutiny
here, because the sum of domestic sales and foreign ones (xh;Sii + x
h;S
ij ) does not depend
on the spatial distribution of foreign rms.
Solving the rst order condition for each government and crossing the reaction func-
tions, we obtain:
tSi = L
2k   4
k + 1
8 i 2 fA;Bg and  < S (16)
4.2.3 Tax comparison
Let us now comment on the properties of the tax outcome. First, observe that equilibrium
taxes are always increasing and convex in the level of trade costs : dt=d > 0 for all
 > 0 and d2t=d 2 > 0 for all . Low trade costs weaken the pro-competitive e¤ect
and make footloose rms more responsive to business tax di¤erences. This encourages
governments to engage in a race to the bottom in taxation. This is a standard result in the
tax competition literature assuming imperfectly integrated and imperfectly competitive
economies (see, among others, Ottaviano and Van Ypersele 2005, Hauer and Wooton,
2010, Gaigné and Wooton, 2011).
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More importantly, the level of taxation at the equilibrium is also shaped by the e¤ort
made by politically-connected managers in stage 0 and the bailing out decision in stage
1. From (14), (15) and (16), we can rank the tax equilibria in the following way under
trade regime 2:
t
H > tH > tS > 0 8  < S (17)
Two mechanisms contribute to explain this ranking.
Recall that a given marginal increase in business taxation in a country leads to a lower
capital outow when  = H than when  = H because competition is weakened by the
exit of high-cost rms in the former case. Consequently, governments are more able to
raise taxation. This e¤ect contributes to explain why t H > tH .
The sign of the di¤erence between tH and tS is a priori not obvious. On the one
hand, governments have an additional incentive to cut taxes when  = H in order to
raise the net return to capital invested in domestic rms (see eq. 12). On the other hand,
domestic rms being an immobile tax base when  = H, governments are more incited
to raise taxes. The fact that tH > tS suggests that the latter e¤ect dominates. Given the
symmetry of the model, this result implies that for all  < S, governments collect more
tax revenues under a laissez-faire policy than when they decide to bailout ine¢ cient rms.
We are now equipped to analyze the bail-out decision of governments (stage 1). This
decision being perfectly anticipated by politically-connected managers, we can determine
their optimal e¤ort (stage 0) and select the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium accordingly.
5 Bailout decision and trade costs
We rst present the governments trade-o¤ between the bailout and the laissez-faire poli-
cies (subsection 5.1). This section being dedicated to the e¤ect of trade integration, we
go beyond the benchmark case we considered so far (that is, trade regime 2) and describe
how a shift from trade regime 1 to trade regime 2 impacts the equilibrium policy decision.
Said di¤erently, we analyze whether or not governments are more prone to adopt a bailout
policy when trade integration is so deep that high-cost rms become exporters. Then,
the last subsection (subsection 5.2) completes the analysis by discussing the impact of a
gradual decline in trade costs within each trade regime.
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5.1 The governments problem
The choice between a laissez-faire policy and a bailout makes sense if and only if politically-
connected managers exert a low e¤ort. In such circumstances, the government selects the
policy option maximizing the overall gain of residents including non-monetary benets
accruing to managers, by anticipating all the e¤ects of its choice on the rest of the game
(stages 2, 3 and 4). If this overall gain of residents W i is higher when  = S than when
 = H, a bailout is preferred to the laissez-faire policy and politically-connected managers
exert a low e¤ort in order to enjoy a higher level of benets (as E:` > E). Therefore,
the decision path S is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Otherwise, the
government adopts a laissez-faire policy and politically-connected managers exert a high
e¤ort. In that case, the decision path H is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Solving the governments problem therefore requires to evaluate the di¤erence in the
overall gain of residents between a bailout policy and a laissez-faire policy.22 If ~W Si denotes
the overall gain of residents that results from a bailout policy when  2 (S; H), this
di¤erence amounts to:
~W Si  W Hi = 12 (k   4)
 
~tSi   t Hi

+ 2'E ~` under trade regime 1
W Si  W Hi = 12 (k   4)
 
tSi   t Hi

+ 2'E` under trade regime 2
(18)
with ~tSi the equilibrium corporate tax and ~` the equilibrium labor demand of a high-cost
rm that occur under a bailout policy for all  2 (S; H) (see next subsection).
Note that the outcome at stages 4, 3 and 2 when  = H (and therefore W Hi ) is the
same across the two trade regimes as high-cost rms exit the market. Therefore, the trade
regime inuences the di¤erence in the overall gain of residents only through the outcome
in the presence of a bailout decision ( ~W Si 6= W Si ). Moreover, whatever the trade regime,
the di¤erence in the overall gain of residents is decomposed in two terms.
The rst term is the di¤erence in tax revenues resulting from the two policy options,
that depends on the tax di¤erential between the two policy options. Therefore, it stands
for the relative cost of a bailout policy as compared to a laissez-faire policy. In subsection
4.2.3, we showed that tSi < t
H
i under trade regime 2. We extend the analysis to regime 1
in next subsection and show that the sign of ~tSi   t Hi can be either positive or negative.
The second term captures the total political benets arising from the amount of jobs
saved thanks to the bailout. Through this term, our model rationalizes the too-big-to-fail
motive for a bailout. This term is positive whatever the trade regime and proportional to
22This di¤erence is evaluated at the equilibrium values of taxes and output, as governments perfectly
anticipate the outcomes of stages 2, 3 and 4.
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the total labor force employed in domestic rms. Therefore, governments are more likely
to rescue domestic manufacturing rms when the number of jobs involved is large.
Importantly, the level of trade integration inuences the governments trade-o¤ (18)
in two respects. First, a discrete shift from trade regime 1 to trade regime 2 inuences
the outcome of a bailout decision and then, the relative costs and benets of each policy
option. We explore these e¤ects in the next two subsections. Secondly, a gradual decline
in trade costs within each trade regime a¤ects the magnitude of the relative cost of each
policy decision as well as the amount of total external benet resulting from a bailout.
This impact of gradual trade liberalization is analyzed in section 5.2.
5.1.1 Bailout decision under trade regime 1
Let us assume that trade costs lie within the range (S; H), so that low-cost rms par-
ticipate to bilateral trade whereas high-cost rms serve their domestic market only. In
order to determine whether  = S or  = H will be the equilibrium decision path, we rst
need to present the outcome at stages 4, 3 and 2 of the game (hereafter ~pSi , ~
S
, ~tS) in the
presence of a bailout. In the short-run, equilibrium prices are given by:
~pSi =
a+ 2 + ~
S
j (k   4)
k   1 for all  2 (
S; H) (19)
In the long-run, the share of mobile rms set up in country A for given tax policies writes:
~
S
A =
1
2
  1
2
k   1
L 2 (k   4) (tA   tB) for all  2 (
S; H) (20)
Solving the tax competition game at stage 1, we obtain the following tax equilibrium
level:
~tSi = L
2k   4
k   1 + '
L
k   1E 8 i 2 fA;Bg for all  2 (
S; H)
It is worth stressing that ~tSi > t
S
i . There are two reasons for that. Firstly, bailed-out
rms being not competitive enough to export when  2 (S; H), competition is relaxed for
foreign rms which are less responsive to a given rise of taxation (
dSA=dtA > d~SA=dtA).
Secondly, the business tax in each country now depends positively on E. To understand
this result, recall that the total non-monetary benets accruing to politically-connected
managers are proportional to the total output and jobs of the rms they manage. When
trade regime 1 prevails, their total output boils down to output on their domestic market
(~xh;Sii ). This output ~x
h;S
ii is obviously increasing in the domestic price level, but the latter
goes down with the share of foreign rms located in the country (see eq. 19). This creates
a new incentive to rise taxes as the resulting capital outow relaxes competition on the
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domestic market, expands production from domestic rms and therefore increases total
non-monetary benets.
As a consequence, business taxes under trade regime 1 may become higher in the
presence of a bailout than under a laissez-faire policy. As the following expression shows,
this is more likely to happen when E and/or ' reach high values:
~tS   t H = L (k   3)'E   2 (k   4)
(k   1) (k   3) ? 0
when E ? 2 (k   4)
' (k   3) =
~E for all  2 (S; H)
(21)
Recalling that t H > tS when  2 (0; S), the following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 2 Consider the tax competition subgame. For intermediary trade costs
( 2 (S; H)), corporate taxes are higher under bailout than under laissez-faire if and
only if the amount of non-monetary benets per job saved is high enough (i.e., E > ~E).
For low trade costs ( < S), corporate taxes are higher under a laissez-faire policy what-
ever the amount of non-monetary benets per job saved.
Now let us analyze governments behavior at stage 1. Given the inequality (21), the
rst component of ~W Si  W Hi (see eq. 18) can be viewed as the opportunity cost of the
bailout when E < ~E, and the opportunity cost of the laissez-faire policy when E > ~E.
As the second term is always positive, there is no trade trade-o¤ for governments when
E > ~E: they always choose the bailout policy. This decision being perfectly anticipated
by politically-connected managers, they choose a low e¤ort. However, when E < ~E,
governments are faced with a trade-o¤ between the loss in tax revenues and the political
benets resulting from a bailout. Specically:
~W Si ? W
H
i if and only if E ? E^
with
E^ =
L 2 (k   4)2
' (L ((a+ 2) + (k   4) ) + (2 (k   1))) (k   3) 2

0; ~E

The above inequality stipulates that political benets from a bailout more than com-
pensate for the loss in tax revenues for all E 2 (E^; ~E). In this case, politically-connected
managers anticipate a bailout in stage 1 and adopt a low e¤ort. In contrast, governments
will adopt a laissez-faire policy and politically-connected managers will choose a high ef-
fort when E < E^. To understand this result, one has to analyse the impact of E on the
relative cost of a bailout and its political benets. On the one hand, a decline in E reduces
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the relative cost of a bailout as the tax gap (21) is proportional to E. However, on the
other hand, the reduction of per-job non-monetary benet also reduces the total amount
of political benets accruing to managers.23 The former e¤ect is predominant since we
show that a bailout equilibrium is more likely to occur when the benet per job saved is
high.
5.1.2 Bailout decision under trade regime 2
Let us now assume that trade costs fall below the threshold S so that high-cost rms
start exporting as well. By replacing t Hi , t
S
i , x
h;S
ii and x
h;S
ij by their equilibrium values into
(18), we get:
W Si ? W
H
i when E ?
4L 2 (k   4)2
' (k   3) ((2a  2k    + 6)L+ 2 (k + 1)) =
E (22)
Above a threshold E, governments decide to bail-out domestic rms and politically-
connected managers choose a low e¤ort. Otherwise, the decision path H describes the
subgame perfect equilibrium. The intuition for this result is the following. A rise in the
level of E increases total political benets, whereas it does not have any impact on the
relative cost of a bailout as neither t H nor tS depend on E. Thus, governments are more
prone to bailout rms when E rises because it increases total political benets from the
bailout without any impact on its relative cost.
Using the expressions of E and E^, it is now possible to analyze to what extent the
equilibrium outcome depends on the level of trade costs. We easily check that E^ < E.
(see Appendix). This leads us to formulate the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The policy choice of governments depends on non-monetary benets of man-
agers as follows:
 if E < E^, governments choose the laissez-faire policy and politically-connected man-
agers exert a high e¤ort whatever the trade regime;
 if E 2 (E^; E), governments bail out high-cost rms and politically-connected man-
agers exert a low e¤ort under trade regime 1, while the opposite result applies under
trade regime 2;
23Given the symmetry of the model, equilibrium taxes are equalized across countries and the location
equilibrium boils down to S = 1=2. As a consequence, the individual output of a high-cost rm ~xh;Sii
is not inuenced by the amount of external benet per job saved. The latter only inuences political
benets at the country level, as they are proportionnal to the number of rms run by politically-connected
managers.
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 if E > E, governments bail out high-cost rms and politically connected managers
exert a low e¤ort whatever the trade regime.
Thus, there exists a range of E values making the government decision dependent
on the trade regime. Indeed, when E 2 (E^; E), a bailout policy is observed at equilib-
rium if and only if high-cost rms are not competitive enough to export. The following
proposition summarizes this result:
Proposition 4 Assume that E 2 (E^; E). If the economy shifts from trade regime 1 to
trade regime 2, governments move away from a bailout policy to a laissez-faire policy.
The intuition for this result comes from the di¤erence in the relative cost of a bailout
as we move from one trade regime to the other. Indeed, t H remains unchanged across
trade regimes whereas ~tS > tS. Therefore, the relative cost of a bailout is lower when high-
cost rms only serve the domestic market (trade regime 1). That is the reason why the
laissez-faire policy may become the optimal policy following a bilateral trade agreement
that allows high-cost rms to start exporting.
5.2 The e¤ects of a gradual trade liberalization
We now analyze, within each trade regime, the inuence of a gradual decline in trade
costs on governmentsdecision.
5.2.1 Trade regime 1
Let us rst investigate the e¤ect of a gradual trade liberalization over the interval (S; H).
Recall that when E > ~E, ~W Si > W
H
i holds for all  2 (S;  H). Therefore, in what
follows, we restrict our analysis to the most interesting case where E < ~E, in which a
bailout may or may not be optimal (see proposition 1) because it engenders tax revenue
losses (~tS < t H). Under these circumstances, a gradual fall of trade costs gives rise to two
opposite forces.
On the one hand, it is straightforward to check that d(t H   ~tS)=d > 0 for all E < ~E
(see eq. (21)). Thus, the decline of trade costs over the interval (S;  H) leads to a reduced
wedge between ~tS and t H , which decreases the relative cost of a bailout in terms of tax
revenues foregone. On the other hand, a fall in trade costs under trade regime 1 expands
total output of low-cost rms, while it shrinks the output and employment of high-cost
rms, which face ercer competition on their domestic market (see eq. 23).
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2~` 2

1 + ~xh;Sii

= 2

1 +
L
4
2a+  (k   4) + 4
k   1

8  2

S; 
H

(23)
Therefore, the political benets arising from a bailout decreases with total labor force
employed in high-cost rms.
In order to gure out which one of these e¤ects predominate, we di¤erentiate E^ with
respect to  and obtain:
dE^
d
= L (k   4)2 (2 (a+ 2) +  (k   4))L+ 4 (k   1)
' (k   3) ((a+ 2 +  (k   4))L+ (2k   2))2
which is positive and convex in  . Trade liberalization erodes the political benets of a
bailout by shrinking the number of jobs to save, but the magnitude of this e¤ect is not
large enough to compensate for the decrease in the relative cost of this policy. Therefore, a
decline of trade costs over the range (S; H) encourages governments to bailout high-cost
rms.
5.2.2 Trade regime 2
When trade regime 2 prevails, the tax di¤erential between a laissez-faire and a bailout
policy is given by:
t
H   tS = 4L (k   4)
(k + 1) (k   3)
2 8  2  0; S (24)
which is increasing in  . Then, a gradual decline in trade costs reduces the relative cost
of a bailout as it does for trade regime 1.
To evaluate the impact of a gradual decline in  on the political benets, we derive the
total labor force employed in the manufacturing sector of domestic rms at the subgame
perfect equilibrium:
2`  2

1 + xh;Sii + x
h;S
ij

= 2

1 +
L
2
2a  2k    + 6
k + 1

8  2  0; S (25)
Clearly, gradual trade liberalization exerts a positive inuence on the total labor force by
expanding output of high-cost rms. The intuition is the following. Bilateral trade being
facilitated, quantities sold by each rm decline on the domestic market while they increase
on the export market. The latter e¤ect dominates, so that total output is increasing as
trade costs fall within the range (0; S). Recall that the relationship goes in the opposite
direction under trade regime 1. Therefore, the impact of trade liberalization on the total
political benets arising from a bailout tightly depends on whether high-cost rms export
or not.
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To summarize, the decline of trade costs has an unambiguous e¤ect on the incentive
for governments to bailout over the range (0; S): it leads to a decrease in the relative
cost of the bailout policy and to an increase in its total political benets. Therefore, it
encourages governments to bailout high-cost rms and d E=d > 0. As we also checked
that dE^=d > 0, our results can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Gradual trade liberalization within each trade regime always encourages
governments to adopt a bailout policy.
To provide a complete picture of the relationship between the level of trade costs and
the incentives to bailout, Figure 2 simulates E (trade regime 2) and E^ (trade regime
1) with respect to  for three di¤erent values of ' (which captures the degree to which
governments care about manufacturing jobs and the non-monetary benets of politically-
connected managers).24 Unsurprisingly, the higher ', the lower the threshold values E
and E^ above which governments decide to bail-out domestic rms. More importantly, we
can visualize in Figure 2 the discontinuity in the incentive to bail-out that arises when
the economy shifts from trade regime 1 to trade regime 2. Starting from high levels of
trade costs such that trade regime 1 prevails, E^ decreases when trade costs fall. At S,
represented by the vertical dash line, the threshold E shifts upward because the relative
cost of a bailout becomes larger. Below S, E decreases again with trade liberalization.
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Figure 2: Bailout and Trade Regimes
24The numerical specication assumes: k = 20; a = 25; L = 100:
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6 Conclusion
One might expect at rst sight that governments are less prone to bailout ine¢ cient rms
in well integrated economies, for ideological or institutional reasons. However, we saw
a resurgence of corporate bailouts in these countries. Our contribution provides a new
explanation why such corporate bailouts occur in developped countries, by analysing how
the fall in trade costs might incite governments to rescue rms rather than let them go
bankrupt.
Using a 2-country model of generalized oligopoly with heterogenous rms and trade
costs, we show that the governments attitude toward politically-connected rms depends
on a trade-o¤ between the relative cost of a bailout in terms of tax revenue losses and its
potential political benets. We assume that these political benets are proportional to
the total labor force in politically-connected rms, so that trade liberalization inuences
both the relative cost of a bailout and its political benets. Importantly, this inuence of
trade liberalization di¤ers depending on whether we focus on a continuous or a discrete
decline in trade costs. If the fall in trade costs is large enough to allow high-cost rms to
become exporters, governments might move away from a bailout policy to a laissez-faire
policy (Proposition 1) because tax revenue losses that would be induced by a bailout
decision rise suddenly. In contrast, a marginal decline in trade costs that does not change
the export status of high cost rms always makes governments more prone to adopt a
bailout decision.
Of course, our model is highly stylized. Still, we can replicate the above results under
the alternative assumption that politically-connected rms are state-owned rms rather
than private ones. We could also enrich the model by assuming that some domestic rms
are run by market-oriented managers whereas others are run by politically-connected
managers. This complicates the algebra without inuencing the main results regarding the
inuence of trade liberalization on the bailout decision. Finally, it would be interesting to
undertake an econometric analysis to gure out whether or not trade integration makes
corporate bailouts more likely and, more crucially, if this impact di¤ers when it comes
to exporting rms as compared to non-exporting rms. We leave this investigation for
future research.
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Appendix
Wage and employment levels
We make two specic assumptions regarding the labor market in order to determine
wage and employment levels.
Firstly, we consider that the T sector is always active in both countries so that labor
mobility across sectors equalizes wages to unity in each country. Thus, we ensure that a
single country cannot supply the world demand for the numéraire good,25 that is :
Lzi >
L
2
(A1)
with the individual consumption of numéraire
zi = z + 1 +
2
L
T i   pi
 
a  pi

if  2  H;S	 (26)
zi = z + 1 +
2
L
T i +
4
L
l;i   pi
 
a  pi

if  = H
Secondly, we consider that in each country, that there is no labor shortage so that
rms are always able to produce. Therefore, we assume that the national labor supply
is never lower than national labor demand. At the location equilibrium, this condition
implies:
L
2
>
8>>>><>>>>:
2 +
(k   4)
2
+
L
2
zHi when  = H
2 +
(k   4)
2
+ 2

xh;Sii + x
h;S
ij

+
L
2
zSi when  = S
(k   4)
2
+
L
2
z
H
i when  = H
(A2)
where the expressions on the right hand side stands for total labor demand (for both
management and production jobs) under each market structures.
Replacing zi by their equilibrium values in each of the two inequalities, the conditions
(A1) and (A2) implies that we consider the following intermediate level of individual
endowment in numéraire:
z 2 zmin; zmax
where zmin and z

max are easily is deducted from, respectively, (A1) and (A2). Finally,
we must ensure that zmin < z

max for all  2 fS;H; Hg. Tedious but easy calculations
leads to the conclusion that zHmax is always higher than z
H
min. Moreover, the assumption
that L > 2k is a su¢ cient condition to verify that z Hmax > z
H
min. Finally, the additional
assumption that the demand parameter a is lower than the threshold amax  (9k   23) =8
25Note that this condition also garantees that the individual consumption in numéraire is positive.
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(which it itself higher than amin) is a su¢ cient condition ensuring that zSmax > z
S
min. We
assume these necessary conditions hold. Therefore, there is always a range of endowment
in numéraire such that wages are equal to unity (A1) and there is no labor shortage in
each country (A2).
The intuition for this range of individual endowment in numéraire is the following. The
individual endowment in numéraire z has to be high enough so that the world demand
in numéraire cannot be served by only one country and therefore, all wages are equalized
to unity thanks to labor mobility across sectors. Nevertheless, z and thereby the size
the T sector should not be too high so that, given the inelastic labor supply, there is no
labor shortage for rms of each sector. While these assumptions seem to be constraining
at a rst sight, they prove the existence of parameter values (in terms of numéraire
endowment) such that wages are equalized to one across all jobs and countries and there
is no labor shortage.26
 Comparison of threshold values E^ and E
Let 	^ = (L ((a+ 2) + (k   4) ) + (2 (k   1))) and 	 = ((2a  2k    + 6)L+ 2 (k + 1)).
Threshold values E^ and E can be rewritten as follows:
E^ =
L 2 (k   4)2
' (k   3) 	^ and
E =
4L 2 (k   4)2
' (k   3) 	
Thus, the di¤erence writes,
E   E^ = L 2 (k   4)2 (2a+ 2k   15 + 4k + 2)L+ (6k   10)
' (k   3) 		^
with (2a+ 2k   15 + 4k + 2) > 0 and (6k   10) > 0 for all k > 4. Moreover, 	^ and
	 are positive within the largest range of trade cost considered in this paper, that is
 2 f0; Hg. Therefore, we verify that E > E^.
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